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The Board of Editors
I. INVESTIGATION TO INDICTMENT
A. Investigation, Search, Seizure, and Arrest
Temporary Investigative Detention. Under Terry v. Ohio and its progeny
the United States Supreme Court recognized that under certain circum-
stances a brief investigatory detention of an individual may be allowable
under the fourth amendment notwithstanding a lack of probable cause.'
The detention is only justified, however, if it is based on specific reason-
able inferences that the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience. 2
In Rodriguez v. State3 an officer had sought to detain a pedestrian on the
sole basis that the pedestrian had glanced over his shoulder at the passing
police car. The pedestrian was subsequently arrested and convicted for
evading arrest. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that there was
no lawful basis for the attempted detention because it was not founded on
specific reasonable inferences that the officer was entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience. 4 Since a crucial element of evading arrest is
that the attempted arrest was lawful,5 the defendant's conviction was over-
turned.
In Davis v. State6 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a re-
minder that while a brief frisk for weapons may accompany a legitimate
investigative detention absent probable cause, before making such a frisk
the police officer must at least be able to point to specific and articulable
facts that warrant his belief that either his safety or that of others is in
danger.7 In Davis a police officer made a legitimate investigative stop and
asked the defendant to produce from his pocket an object making a round
bulge about half the size of a man's fist. The court reversed the subsequent
conviction for possession of marijuana because the state produced no evi-
l. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
2. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). In the words of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals: "There must be a reasonable suspicion by the law enforcement officer that some
activity out of the ordinary is or had occured, some suggestion to connect the detained per-
son with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to the crime."
Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
3. 576 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
4. Id. at 420.
5. Id. at 419.
6. 576 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
7. Id. at 380-81; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
dence of specific and articulable facts that would support a conclusion that
the bulge was a weapon, that the defendant was armed and dangerous, or
that the officer believed his safety or that of others was in danger.8
The United States Supreme Court handed down three significant deci-
sions concerning investigative detention during the survey period. In Dun-
away v. New York 9 the Court held that detention for custodial
interrogation upon less than probable cause for arrest violates the fourth
amendment. The Court stressed that the exceptions to the general rule
requiring probable cause, such as those enunciated in Terry v. Ohio and its
progeny,' 0 were allowed only because the intrusions in those cases fell far
short of the kind of intrusion associated with arrest."I In Dunaway the
defendant was taken into custody, driven to police headquarters, placed in
an interrogation room, and questioned after being read Miranda warnings.
He was not told, however, that he was under arrest. The Court held that
his treatment was virtually indistinguishable from a traditional arrest, and
that the degree of intrusion demanded a showing of probable cause.' 2
Brown v. Texas13 involved the constitutional validity of a conviction
under a Texas Penal Code provision that makes it a crime to refuse to
identify oneself to a police officer upon request. 14 In Brown two police
officers stopped the defendant in an area noted for a.high incidence of
drug traffic and asked him to identify himself. The officers testified that
they had stopped the defendant only because he looked suspicious and
they had not seen him in the area before. When the defendant refused to
identify himself, he was arrested for violation of section 38 of the Texas
Penal Code.' 5 In a unanimous decision, the Court held the application of
the statute to the defendant violated the fourth amendment because the
officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was en-
gaged or had engaged in criminal conduct.' 6 The Court did not hold that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face, however, and expressly de-
clined to decide whether an individual may be punished for refusing to
identify himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop that satisfies
fourth amendment requirements.' 7
In Delaware v. Prouse'8 a patrolman stopped a car occupied by the de-
fendant and subsequently arrested him for possession of marijuana that
was in plain view as the patrolman approached the car. The patrolman
testified, however, that he had observed neither traffic violations nor suspi-
8. 576 S.W.2d at 381.
9. 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2258, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 828 (1979).
10. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
if. 99 S. Ct. at 2256, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 835.
12. Id. at 2258, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 838.
13. 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979).
14. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence
address to a police officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information."
15. Id.
16. 99 S. Ct. at 2641, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 363.
17. 99 S. Ct. at 2641 n.3, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 363 n.3.
18. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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cious activity, but that he had made the stop only to check the driver's
license and registration. In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court
held that except where there is at least an articulable and reasonable suspi-
cion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or
that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
violation of law, stopping the automobile and detaining the driver in order
to check his driver's license and the registration of the car are unreasona-
ble under the fourth amendment.19 The Court was careful to point out,
however, that a state is not precluded from using roadblock-type stops to
question all oncoming traffic or to develop alternative spot check methods
that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise
of discretion.20
Detention for Issuance of Traffic Ticket not an Arrest. In Thomas v. State21
the defendant was stopped for making an illegal turn. The officer had him
sit in the back seat of the patrol car while the officer wrote out a ticket.
While this was being done, another officer searched a coat lying on the seat
of the defendant's car and discovered illegal drugs. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that since the defendant was not in custody at the
time of the search, but merely under temporary detention for the issuance
of a traffic ticket, the search was not incident to an arrest.22 Because the
court found that there was no probable cause to justify the search, the case
was reversed and remanded.
Search Warrant-Blood. It is now clearly established that the taking of a
defendant's blood is a search and seizure under the Texas Constitution.2 3
Further developing this issue, the court of criminal appeals in Ferguson v.
State24 held that either a warrant or the defendant's consent must be ob-
tained before a blood sample may be taken from a defendant in custody.
The opinion ignored the Supreme Court's ruling in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia25 that would allow the taking of a blood sample without consent in
exigent circumstances. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has yet to
address the question of whether blood is to be construed as either "prop-
erty" or an "item" under recently amended article 18.02(10) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.26 If blood does not fall within the meaning
19. Id. at 663.
20. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals anticipated Prouse in White v. State, 574
S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
21. 572 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
22. Id. at 509.
23. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
24. 573 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
25. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber the exigent circumstance was that a delay in
taking the blood sample would allow the alcohol content of the blood to diminish thus
destroying the evidence needed to prove the offense of driving under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor. Id. at 770-71. In Ferguson, however, a delay would not have been harmful;
the defendant was accused of murder and the blood sample was needed to compare blood
types with blood found on the defendant's clothing and on a knife alleged to be the murder
weapon. 573 S.W.2d at 520.
26. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (Vernon 1977) defines permissible grounds
1980]
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of subdivision 10, then the only circumstances under which blood may be
taken from an individual in custody is if there is voluntary consent. 27
Search Warrant Affidavit-Truthfulness Challenge. In 1978 the United
States Supreme Court held that if a defendant subsequent to the ex parte
issuance of a search warrant makes a substantial preliminary showing that
an affiant, knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the
truth, included a false statement in his affidavit for a search warrant, the
fourth amendment requires a hearing if the alleged false statement was
necessary to the finding of probable cause. 28 During this survey period the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted and gave retroactive effect to
this holding in Ramsey v. State.29 Ramsey thus sounds the death knell for
the long-standing Texas rule that a challenge to the affidavit's statement of
probable cause could not go behind the face of the affidavit.30
Standing. In Rakas v. Illinois31 the United States Supreme Court signifi-
cantly redefined the scope of personal fourth amendment interests. The
defendant in Rakas sought to prevent the introduction of evidence seized
from a car in which he was riding, even though he owned neither the car
nor the shotgun and shells that were confiscated in the search and intro-
duced as evidence at his trial. In a five-to-four decision the Supreme Court
affirmed the defendant's conviction on the grounds that the defendant's
fourth amendment rights could not have been infringed by the search, and
in so doing, clarified the formula for the determination of fourth amend-
ment "standing. 32
The defendant sought to have the Court adopt the "target" theory of
for issuance of a search warrant. Prior to the 1977 amendment of this article, the court of
criminal appeals had held that a search warrant could not be issued for blood because blood
was not listed in the article. Smith v. State, 557 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Effec-
tive May 25, 1977, however, subdivision (10) was added to art. 18.02 and reads: "A search
warrant may be issued to search for and seize: ...(10) property or items, except the per-
sonal writings by the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting evidence
tending to show that a particular person committed an offense."
27. Since blood type remains constant throughout life, a blood sample cannot be taken
to prevent "destruction of evidence." Smith v. State, 557 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977). Likewise, search for blood cannot be justified on the basis of endangerment of the
officer, or as an incident to a lawful arrest. Id. This reasoning again ignores the type of
situation exemplified by Schmerber in which delay will result in the destruction of evidence.
See note 25 supra.
28. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
29. 579 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
30. See, e.g., Oubre v. State, 542 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
31. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
32. The Court devoted an entire section of its opinion to the propriety of the use of the
word "standing" in this context. The Court held that in the light of the long standing insis-
tence that fourth amendment rights are personal rights, the issue of whether an individual
may challenge evidence on fourth amendment grounds is more properly placed within the
purview of substantive fourth amendment law than within the theoretically separate area of
standing. Properly the first inquiry is thus whether the disputed search and seizure infringed
an interest of the defendant that the fourth amendment was designed to protect, not whether
an individual has standing to challenge the evidence. 439 U.S. at 139-40. Nevertheless, for
purposes of brevity and consistency, this article will continue to refer to this area of inquiry
as fourth amendment standing.
[Vol. 34
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fourth amendment standing, whereby a person may challenge the legality
of a search in order to supress evidence if the search was directed against
him.33 The Court rejected this approach, stressing that fourth amendment
rights are personal rights,34 and that the mere fact that a person is ag-
grieved by the introduction of evidence procured by a search will not allow
that person to challenge the evidence if the serach only infringed upon the
fourth amendment rights of a third party. 35
While recognizing that a proprietary interest in the premises searched is
not essential to the existence of personal fourth amendment rights, the
Court refused to abide by the criteria enunciated in Jones v. United
States.36 In Jones, the Court had stated that "anyone legitimately on
premises where a search occurs" may challenge the introduction of evi-
dence procured by the search.37 In place of the "legitimately on premises"
test of fourth amendment standing, the Rakas court held that the proper
test is whether the person who claims the protection of the fourth amend-
ment had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.38
Legislative Modfication of the State's Right to Issue a Search Warrant. In
1977 the legislature amended article 18.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure by adding subdivision (10), which allows issuance of a search
warrant for "property or items, except the personal writings by the ac-
cused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting evidence tending
to show that a particular person committed an offense." 39 The 1979 legis-
lature has both clarified and modified this provision. First the legislature
has provided that a search warrant may not be issued pursuant to subdivi-
sion (10) unless the sworn affidavit asserts
(1) that a specific offense has been committed, (2) that the specifically
described property or items that are to be searched for or seized con-
stitute evidence of that offense or evidence that a particular person
committed that offense, and (3) that the property or items constituting
evidence to be searched for or seized are located at or on the particu-
lar person, place, or thing to be searched.40
This amendment also only permits judges at the county court level and
33. This argument was based on language appearing in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261 (1960).
34. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
35. 439 U.S. at 134.
36. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
37. Id. at 267.
38. The Court relied on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) for this test. In
a biting dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, asserted
the majority holding to be "that the Fourth Amendment protects property, not people." 439
U.S. at 156-57. Justice White further pointed out that no matter how "unlawful stopping
and searching a car may be, absent a possessory or ownership interest, no 'mere' passenger
may object, regardless of his relationship to the owner." Id. at 157. This author believes
that Mr. Justice White accurately asserts that "the majority's conclusion has no support in
the Court's controlling decisions, in the logic of the Fourth Amendment, or in common
sense." Id.
39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(10) (Vernon 1977).
40. Id. art. 18.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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above to issue subdivision (10) warrants. Moreover, the legislature com-
pletely excluded applicability of subdivision (10) to newspapers, news
magazines, television stations, and radio stations.4'
B. Confessions and Admissions
Miranda Defects-Waiver. In Ochoa v. State42 the defendant was arrested
for the murder of a police officer, read his Miranda rights, and brought to
the local jail. Upon interrogation, the defendant mentioned that he
thought he should speak to an attorney, but he did not press the issue.
After this statement the police officers continued to talk with the defend-
ant, and eventually the defendant signed a confession to the murder. At
trial, defendant objected that the confession was obtained in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona.43 The defendant testified to substantially the same
facts as contained in his confession, but interjected a claim of self-defense.
During cross-examination the defendant admitted that he had signed the
confession voluntarily.
Upon appeal from a guilty verdict, the defendant challenged the admis-
sion of the confession. The court of criminal appeals agreed that the con-
fession was obtained in violation of Miranda, and was therefore
inadmissible, because interrogation continued after the defendant had
mentioned his desire to speak to an attorney.44 The court held that if a
defendant indicates in any way that he desires to invoke his right to coun-
sel, Miranda requires that interrogation must cease.4 5 The state contended
that defendant had waived any Miranda defect when he testified to sub-
stantially the same facts as contained in his confession. The court, while
acknowledging that a defendant waives a claim of harm when he testifies
in his own behalf and admits the truth of the objectionable testimony, nev-
ertheless held that such a waiver does not occur if he introduces rebutting
testimony in an attempt to meet, destroy, or explain the evidence offered
against him.46 Finally, the court held that the defendant's admission that
he had voluntarily signed the confession did not make the confession ad-
missible in the prosecution's case in chief, if it was not taken in compliance
with Miranda.47
The Meaning of Custodyfor Oral Confession Purposes. In Stone v. State4 8
the defendant, the suspect in a rape case, was requested to appear at the
police station for questioning. After requesting a polygraph test, the de-
fendant was taken before a magistrate and given the statutory warnings
41. Id. art. 18.01(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
42. 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. 573 S.W.2d at 800.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 801. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22, § 5 (Vernon 1979) provides
that such a confession may be used for impeachment.
48. 583 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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normally concomitant to an arrest.49 The defendant then took the test, was
told that he had failed and would probably be charged, and was asked to
wait in another room at the station. At this time the defendant orally con-
fessed to a private investigator.
At the time of the trial, article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure5° provided that unless the confession leads to tangible evidence
of guilt, an oral confession is inadmissible if the confessor was in the cus-
tody of an officer at the time of the confession. The Stone court held that
because the defendant went to the police station voluntarily and in his own
car, and was at no time prior to his confession told he was under arrest or
that he could not leave the police station, he was not in custody for the
purposes of old article 38.22. 51 Therefore, the court held that the trial
court had not erred in admitting the confession.52
The majority in Stone drew a close parallel to Oregon v. Mathiason,53 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who volun-
tarily met with a police officer at the police station, was told that he was
not under arrest, confessed after a brief conversation, and was allowed to
leave, was not in custody. Judge Roberts dissented, arguing that the ma-
jority's reliance on Oregon v. Mathiason was poorly placed. Judge Roberts
distinguished Stone from Mathiason on the basis that in Stone, the defend-
ant was taken before a magistrate and read his rights, and having been
informed that he had failed the polygraph test, was told to wait in a room,
thereby having his freedom of movement restricted. 54 Because the court
held in Maldonado v. State55 that an arrest is complete whenever a per-
son's liberty is restricted or restrained, the denial of defendant's request for
a rehearing en banc is surprising.
Confession Obtained by Promising Benefit. The defendant in Washington v.
State56 was indicted on charges of burglary and theft and during plea ne-
gotiations requested the opportunity to take a polygraph examination.
The prosecutor agreed to allow this examination on the condition that the
defendant first sign a stipulation admitting that he had committed the bur-
glary. The prosecutor promised that if the defendant passed the examina-
tion, the state would move for a new trial. The defendant claimed that the
prosecutor had also promised to disregard the stipulation if the test was
passed. Defendant agreed and passed the test, but after a new trial was
49. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (Vernon 1977) enunciates the admonitory
procedure that must follow every arrest "without unnecessary delay."
50. 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 722, § i, at 469.
51. 583 S.W.2d at 413.
52. Id. The court qualified its holding by referring to art. 38.22 as it read at the time of
trial. The present version of this statute is at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1980).
53. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
54. 583 S.W.2d at 418.
55. 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
56. 582 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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granted he was reindicted for theft, and the stipulation was introduced at
trial.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the stipulation was
inadmissible under the Texas rule that renders inadmissible confessions
obtained by promise of benefit.5 7 The four part test for application of this
rule is that the promise must: "(1) be of some benefit to the defendant; (2)
be positive; (3) be made or sanctioned by a person in authority; and, (4) be
of such character as would be likely to influence the defendant to speak
untruthfully." 58 As applied to Washington, the benefit was the opportunity
to take the polygraph test and the possible discharge if he passed it; the
promise was positive rather than equivocal; and the prosecutor making the
promise was a person "in authority." 59 Because the prosecutor had alleg-
edly promised to disregard the stipulation if the test was passed, a defend-
ant convinced of his innocence had nothing to lose by signing the
stipulation, and therefore the promise was of such a character as would be
likely to influence the defendant to speak untruthfully. 60
II. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Extradition
In October of 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided Michigan
v. Doran,61 in which the defendant had been arrested in Michigan for pos-
session of a stolen truck driven from Arizona. Upon notification of the
defendant's arrest in Michigan, an Arizona justice of the peace issued a
warrant for defendant's arrest. The defendant was arraigned in Michigan
as a fugitive. The Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition
and the defendant's extradition was ordered. Defendant petitioned the
Michigan court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the extradition
warrant was invalid for failure to comply with the Uniform Criminal Ex-
tradition Act.62 The Michigan court twice denied the writ, and the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's complaint. The Supreme
Court of Michigan reversed the trial court's extradition order, but the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the extradition
clause of the United States Constitution,63 "once the governor of the asy-
lum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demand-
ing state's judicial determination that probable cause existed, no further
judicial inquiry may be had on that issue in the asylum state."'64 The court
reasoned that "[t]o allow plenary review in the asylum state of issues that
can be fully litigated in the charging state would defeat the plain purposes
of the summary and mandatory procedures authorized by article IV, sec-
57. Id. at 123; see Fisher v. State, 379 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
58. 582 S.W.2d at 124.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
62. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 780.1 to .31 (1975).
63. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.




This precise question was presented to the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in 1979 in Exparte Moore.66 There, the defendant appealed from
the denial of his asserted right to challenge the probable cause for the war-
rant issued by the state of Florida during a Texas habeas corpus hearing.
The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that in light of Doran, the
defendant's right to challenge probable cause to arrest in Florida, the de-
manding state, only arises if the documents supporting the Florida gover-
nor's warrant are insufficient to establish that a judicial determination of
probable cause has been made in the demanding state.67
B. Indictment and Information
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a] person repre-
sented by legal counsel may in open court or by written instrument volun-
tarily waive the right to be accused by indictment of any offense other than
a capital felony."68 This section of the code was interpreted in Lackey v.
State,69 where the defendant based his appeal from a conviction for bur-
glary with intent to kidnap on the ground that the trial court had errone-
ously proceeded to trial without an effective waiver of indictment and thus
with a void information. Although the trial record was devoid of evidence
that the defendant had waived the indictment, the state argued that no
error existed because the appellant had not been harmed. According to the
state, lack of detriment to the appellant was shown in that appellant never
affirmatively objected to the use of the information rather than the indict-
ment.
The court of criminal appeals reversed defendant's conviction and re-
manded the case, holding that a defendant must personally waive the right
to be accused by indictment. 70 Reiterating its prior holding in King v.
State,71 the court held that an effective waiver must be given intelligently,
voluntarily, and knowingly by the accused while represented by counsel.72
The court further held that a defendant's remaining silent and voicing no
objection to being tried by information does not constitute an effective
waiver.7 3 Since a felony information acts in lieu of an indictment, its va-
lidity is essential to the court's jurisdiction; however, an information only
becomes valid upon an effective waiver of indictment.74 Finding no effec-
tive waiver by defendant, the court held that reversal was mandated, since
the trial court never acquired jurisdiction of the case.75
65. Id.
66. 579 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
67. Id. at 477.
68. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.141 (Vernon 1977).
69. 574 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
70. Id. at 100.
71. 473 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
72. 574 S.W.2d at 100.
73. Id.
74. 473 S.W.2d at 48-49, 51-52.
75. 574 S.W.2d at 100.
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C. Right to Counsel
In the 1972 case of Argersinger v. Hamlin76 the United States Supreme
Court announced that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial.77 Because
the rule applies only to actual sentencing and not the possibility of impris-
onment, Argersinger presents judges with the dilemma of having to decide
in advance of trial whether to discard a possible punishment of imprison-
ment or to appoint counsel and retain this discretion.78
The decisions of Texas courts have been unclear about the scope of the
Argersinger holding and have differed substantially in their resolution of
the question left open by that opinion. In the 1976 case of Exparte Her-
rin,79 in which the defendant's actual sentence involved imprisonment in
addition to a fine, the court of criminal appeals cited Argersinger for the
proposition that "criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases are entitled to
counsel if there exists a possibility that imprisonment may be imposed." 80
The court could find no evidence of a knowing, intelligent waiver of de-
fendant's right to counsel, and thus voided the defendant's convictions.
During the survey period, however, Empy v. State8' reversed Herrin on
this point. In Empy, defendant, who was not represented by counsel at
trial, was punished by fine only for conviction of a misdemeanor, although
imprisonment was a potential punishment under the statute.82 The de-
fendant contended, on the basis of Herrin, that the judgment was void
because, when he entered his plea of guilty without representation by
counsel, there existed a possibility that his punishment would include im-
prisonment. The Empy court rejected this contention, and overruled Her-
rin to the extent of its erroneous interpretation of Argersinger. The court
stated that the trial judge knew of the proper holding in Argersinger and
knew that when he accepted the defendant's plea of guilty he could not
assess punishment of imprisonment, but could only assess a fine if the ap-
pellant was not represented by counsel. The court rejected the argument
that article 26.0483 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the
appointment of counsel in any case in which imprisonment is a possible
penalty under the applicable statute.84 The Empy court read Argersinger
76. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
77. Id. at 37.
78. Id. at 53.
79. 537 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
80. Id. at 35.
81. 571 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
82. Defendant's misdemeanor, theft of more than $20.00 but less than $200.00, was clas-
sified as a class A misdemeanor, and therefore his sentence could have included up to one
year imprisonment. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.21(2) (Vernon 1974).
83. "Whenever the court determines at an arraignment or at any time prior to arraign-
ment that an accused charged with a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
is too poor to employ counsel, the court shall appoint one or more practicing attorneys to
defend him." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04 (Vernon 1966) (emphasis added).
84. The court construed art. 26.04 to comply with Argersinger's holding:
Although this statute antedates Argersinger . . . .we construe it in light of
[Vol. 34
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
to say that under these circumstances, the trial court was not required to
appoint an attorney to represent the defendant. 85 Thus, Empy holds that if
only a fine actually is assessed in a misdemeanor case, the judgment is not
void when the indigent defendant is not represented by counsel and is con-
victed under a statute that includes imprisonment as a possible punish-
ment.86
Four judges dissented to the Empy holding, based on their belief that, as
a constitutional principal, "any criminal defendant faced with a possible
term of imprisonment, regardless of the charge's classification, is entitled
to the appointment of counsel when indigent. The penalty ultimately as-
sessed would be immaterial. T87 The dissenters also based their opinion on
the anomaly that would result if an indigent defendant who was charged
with an offense carrying a possible prison sentence but not represented by
counsel were nevertheless given a punishment of imprisonment. In such a
case, there would be no one to advise the defendant that, under
Argersinger, the trial court had not been empowered to impose a prison
sentence upon defendant and that such imposition constitutes a denial of
defendant's sixth amendment rights.88
The position of the Empy dissent finds support in the Fifth Circuit opin-
ions that have considered the question. In Thomas v. Savage89 the Fifth
Circuit stated that "[t]he necessity for counsel is judged by the maximum
penalty the defendant may receive." 90 The court acknowledged that "[i]n
this respect the cases of this circuit go beyond the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Argersinger v. Hamlim . . . , which would only require the ap-
pointment of counsel when a sentence of imprisonment is imposed." 91
The view of the Fifth Circuit and the Empy dissent appears to comport
more realistically with the purposes of the sixth amendment and avoids the
obvious problem presented by the Empy majority's opinion: the dilemma
of an unrepresented defendant who, despite Argersinger, is erroneously
sentenced to prison and has no attorney to advise him of the sentence's
unconstitutionality. It is hoped that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
will reconsider the implications of its decision and overrule it at the earliest
opportunity. Alternatively, future defendants without counsel penalized
under Empy should petition the United States Supreme Court, which,
Argersinger ... to require the appointment of counsel only when the court
knows it will assess punishment including imprisonment or when the trial is
before a jury where the possible punishment authorized includes imprison-
ment. A defendant is not punishable by imprisonment if he is unrepresented
by counsel unless he waives counsel.
571 S.W.2d at 528 (emphasis by the court).
85. 571 S.W.2d at 528.
86. Id.
87. 571 S.W.2d at 535, (Phillips, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Judges Orion,
Roberts and Davis also dissented.
88. Id. at 536.
89. 513 F.2d 536 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 924 (1975).
90. Id. at 537 (emphasis in original). See also Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.
1976).
91. 513 F.2d at 537 (citation omitted).
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when faced squarely with this question, is likely to settle this dispute in
favor of the Fifth Circuit's position.
D. Speedy Trial
During the survey period, the court of criminal appeals was called upon
to construe its power, under the Texas Speedy Trial Act,92 to issue writs of
mandamus against trial judges who fail to set aside indictments of criminal
defendants who are not tried within the statutorily prescribed periods. Al-
though the court of criminal appeals apparently possesses the power to
issue writs of mandamus to compel speedy trial under the Texas constitu-
tion,93 the court has taken an extremely restrictive approach to the issu-
ance of these writs to petitioners seeking to enforce their rights under the
Speedy Trial Act.
In Ordunez v. Bean,94 the defendant had moved the trial court to set
aside its indictment for felony theft on the grounds that he had not been
brought to trial within 120 days as required by the Speedy Trial Act.95
The court of criminal appeals reversed the writ on two grounds. First, the
court found that the trial judge's determination, that overcrowded dockets
were an "exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of the Speedy
Trial Act, 96 was an exercise of "judicial discretion" to which mandamus
was not available. 97 Next, the court held that petitioner had not fulfilled
his burden of demonstrating that no adequate remedy, other than manda-
mus, was available at law. The court noted that appeal was available to
the petitioner, in the event of his conviction, to test any asserted denial of
his right to a speedy trial on both statutory and constitutional bases. 98 The
92. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 32A.01, 32A.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980). Article
32A.01 provides: "Insofar as is practicable, the trial of a criminal action shall be given
preference over trials of civil cases, and the trial of a criminal action against a defendant
who is detained in jail pending trial of the action shall be given preference over trials of
other criminal actions." Article 32A.02 requires the court to grant a motion to set aside an
indictment if the time elapsed before trial exceeds the maximum stipulated by the article for
the offense charged. During the survey period, the legislature increased the number of days
for which an alleged misdemeanant can be held before being brought to trial from 30 to 60.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
93. TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 5 was amended in 1977 to provide: "Subject to such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by law, regarding criminal matters, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, procedendo, prohibition .... " Prior to this amendment, only the Supreme
Court of Texas had been empowered to issue writs of mandamus to compel speedy trials. In
Thomas v. Stephenson, 561 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), the courts acknowledged
this recent grant of mandamus power and issued a writ to compel a speedy trial for the
petitioner.
94. 579 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
95. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 § I(i) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 § 4(10) provides that in computing the
time by which the state must be ready for trial, any "reasonable period of delay that is
justified by exceptional circumstances" is to be excluded.
97. 579 S.W.2d at 913. In the dissenting portion of Judge Phillip's opinion he points out
that mandamus was certainly available to correct abuses of discretion, and it seems clear
that a trial judge's arbitrary refusal to enforce art. 32A.02 would be an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 914-15.
98. Id. at 913-14.
[Vol. 34
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
court cited the United States Supreme Court opinion of United States v.
McDonald99 in support of the proposition that allowing appeals of pretrial
orders denying motions to dismiss for violation of the right to speedy trial
would serve only to delay trial further. 00
Similarly, in Hazen v. Pickett,10 the court of criminal appeals refused
the petitioner, whose waiting period also allegedly had exceeded the statu-
tory maximum, a writ of mandamus against the judge who had denied
petitioner's motion to set aside his indictment. Citing Ordunez as control-
ling, the court found that the petitioner had not sustained his burden of
proof under the "traditional two-step test." Since the petitioner had an
"adequate remedy by appeal" if he were convicted, the court held that he
had failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief by mandamus. 0 2 Finally,
in Exparte Delbert, 03 the court of criminal appeals refused a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to discharge the petitioner, who had not been
brought to trial within the statutorily prescribed period. Relying again
upon Ordunez, the court held that post-conviction appeal constitutes an
adequate remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial.' 0 4 The court
made clear that Ordunez was none the less applicable because the peti-
tioner sought a writ of habeas corpus rather than mandamus.
In holding that post-conviction appeal is an adequate alternative rem-
edy for denial of the right to speedy trial and that relief by mandamus is
available only to one who proves that no other adequate remedy exists, the
court of criminal appeals has emasculated the Speedy Trial Act and turned
its back on the power to grant extraordinary writs specifically granted it by
the legislature. The court's interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act compels
the criminal defendant to wait until after trial, no matter how egregious
the delay, to vindicate his rights under the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Texas Speedy Trial Act. The court's certainty
that post-conviction appeal is an adequate remedy is unfounded, in view
of the fact that the right to speedy trial attaches to all those accused,
whether they are ultimately convicted or acquitted. The court's interpreta-
tion, moreover, promises to congest dockets further, as many defendants,
whether convicted or acquitted, will return to the courts to vindicate the
former abridgment of their right to a speedy trial. It is hoped that the
court will reconsider seriously its position on this issue and develop a more
rational, functional approach toward future petitioners before too many
unnecessary trials have occurred.
E. Double Jeopardy
Attachment of Double Jeopardy in Jury Trials. The double jeopardy clause
99. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
100. 579 S.W.2d at 914.
101. 581 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
102. Id.
103. 582 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
104. Id. at 147.
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of the United States Constitution 105 prohibits multiple prosecution by a
single sovereign for a single offense. Thus it must be determined when
double jeopardy first attaches during criminal trials. In Crist v. Bretz, °6
the United States Supreme Court held that double jeopardy attaches when
the jury is empaneled and sworn, and that this federal rule "is an integral
part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy."' 107 The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied this rule of attachment in Mc-
Lendon v. State, 10 8 dismissing the reindictment of a defendant whose first
trial, following the empanelling of a jury, had been dismissed upon the
motion of the state that had failed to secure a necessary witness. The court
held that once defendant goes forward with sufficient evidence to establish
a claim of double jeopardy, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the
defendant consented to the state's motion to dismiss. 0 9 Since the state
failed to fulfill this burden the reindictment was dismissed.
Appellate Finding of Legally Insufficient Evidence. Recently the United
States Supreme Court held in Burks v. United States"0 and Greene v. Mas-
sey"' that where an appellate court determines that the evidence pro-
duced by the state at trial is insufficient as a matter of law, the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution prohibits the remanding of the cause
for retrial. The court made clear in Burks that the prosecutor's failure to
muster sufficient evidence in the first proceeding in no way entitled the
prosecution to another opportunity to try a defendant when the state gains
access to additional evidence, because the appellate court's determination
of insufficiency as a matter of law operates as a resolution of factual is-
sues.112 Burks also held that it is immaterial whether a defendant has
sought a new trial as one of his remedies, or even as his sole remedy, be-
cause a motion for new trial cannot be said to waive the right to a judg-
ment of acquittal that vests in a defendant upon an appellate finding of
insufficient evidence to convict."13
In two cases decided during the survey period," 4 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals adhered to the teachings of Burks and Greene and held
that retrial following an appellate determination of insufficient evidence
violates the double jeopardy clause. In one of these cases, Chase v.
State," 15 the defendant had been convicted upon retrial, following an ap-
pellate determination of insufficient evidence at the first proceeding. Re-
versing the conviction and ordering the entry of judgment of acquittal, the
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
107. Id. at 31.
108. 583 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
109. Id. at 779-80.
110. 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
IlM. 437 U.S. 19, 24 (1978).
112. 437 U.S. at 17.
113. Id.
114. Chase v. State, 573 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Damron v. State, 570
S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
115. 573 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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Chase court also spelled out the standard applicable in Texas for deter-
mining legal insufficiency at both the trial and appellate levels:
The standard for review . . . on sufficiency of the evidence is not to
consider whether or not [the court] believes or disbelieves any witness,
but merely to determine whether or not, in looking at the evidence in
a light most favorable to sustain the verdict, there is any evidence
which the jury could have believed in arriving at such a verdict. 116
The Supreme Court in Burks made a special effort to emphasize the
distinction between the double jeopardy implications of retrial after a de-
termination of insufficient evidence, as opposed to retrial after finding of
trial error. The court stated that the double jeopardy clause presents no
bar to retrial after an appellate determination of trial error, because rever-
sal for error does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government
has failed to prove its case; as such it implies nothing with respect to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. 117 "When [a finding of trial error]
occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication
of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for
insuring that the guilty are punished.""I 8 The court of criminal appeals
applied this distinction in Exparte Duran, 19 where the defendant had
won reversal of his conviction upon the appellate court's determination
that the trial court erred in admitting a stipulation to which the defendant
had not consented. Defendant was retried and again convicted, but the
court adhered to the Burks distinction and thus rejected defendant's claim
that the retrial following reversal for trial error had placed him in double
jeopardy. 120
A probationer in Davenport v. State12 1 claimed that the double jeopardy
clause, as well as the doctrine of res judicata, rendered invalid a second
probation revocation hearing, where the first hearing had been lost by the
state due to insufficient evidence. The court of criminal appeals held that
neither the doctrine of double jeopardy nor res judicata applied, because
the supervision of probation is an administrative function of the court,
rather than a judicial one, and thus no determination of guilt or innocence
within the meaning of Burks had occurred. 122 Three judges dissented vig-
orously to the court's "administrative function" exception, emphasizing
the point made in Burks and Greene that the state's failure to gather suffi-
cient evidence in one proceeding does not entitle it to subject an individual
to further risk of punishment for the same act.' 23
116. Id. at 249 n.1.
117. 437 U.S. at 15.
118. Id.
119. 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
120. Id. at 686.
121. 579 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
122. Id. at 75-76.




The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "[ilt shall be the
primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecu-
tors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. They shall not suppress
facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the ac-
cused."' 124 The case of Exparte Lewis 25 represents a broad, purposeful
application of this provision to the disclosure of potentially exculpatory
evidence of which the defense is unaware. In Lewis, the defendant had
pled guilty to murder at trial and brought a post-conviction application for
habeas corpus relief. Relief was requested on the grounds that before and
during the defendant's trial, the district attorney possessed a letter from a
psychiatrist who had examined the defendant in prison, and who stated in
the letter that defendant was in his opinion a paranoid schizophrenic who
"does not appear to comprehend the seriousness of the crime that he has
been charged with."' 126 The letter further stated that the defendant's psy-
chosis caused a "'marked impairment to comprehend much of what is go-
ing on about him. . . . It is doubtful that this man can be held
accountable for his behavior .... -"127 Despite the obvious importance of
this evidence to the issue of defendant's competency to stand trial, the
prosecutor never made the existence of the letter known to the defense.
The court of criminal appeals held that the state's failure to disclose the
existence of evidence of such substantial value to the defense constituted a
denial of due process, and reversed the conviction. 28 The court stated that
elemental fairness required the disclosure even without a specific request
from the defense, despite the accused's plea of guilty to the charge.12 9
G. Incompetency to Stand Trial
Test for Determining Competency to Stand Trial. In Dusky v. United
States 30 the United States Supreme Court stated that the test for deter-
mining whether the defendant is competent to stand trial must be:
"[w]hether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a ra-
tional as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him.' 3'
Despite the fact that the court of criminal appeals has often recognized the
Dusky test when incompetency is alleged by reason of insanity, 32 the
124. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (Vernon 1977).
125. 587 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
126. Id. at 700.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 703.
129. Id. at 701.
130. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Exparte Hagans, 558 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ainsworth v.




court upheld the validity of a different test in Corley v. State:133 "To estab-
lish insanity at the present time it must be established by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant is laboring under such mental disease or
defect of the mind as to be rendered incompetent to make a rational de-
fense to the charges against him."' 134 Corley objected to this test and con-
tended that the federal constitution required application of the Dusky
test. 135 The court rejected this argument on the ground that the Supreme
Court has never held Dusky to be constitutionally mandated. 136 It would
appear that the use of either Dusky or the Corley test would be permissible
in Texas 37 for determining the competency of a defendant. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, regards the Dusky test as constitutionally required by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. 138 Moreover, a subsequent
Texas criminal appeals case has held that the proper test is the standard
announced in Dusky. 13 9 Thus it seems doubtful the Corley test will be
applied to any great extent.
Waiver of Competency Hearing By Defendant. In Exparte Lockin140 the
state sought to sustain the defendant's conviction for burglary on the
ground that he had waived his defense of incompetency when he failed to
file for a separate trial on that issue. The court rejected this contention
stating that to sustain the conviction without a trial on the issue of Lock-
lin's competency would be a violation of his due process rights. 141 Quoting
Pate v. Robinson, 142 the court stated that the waiver argument had been
answered: "[I1t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incom-
petent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his capacity to stand
trial." 143
III. PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS
A. Plea Bargaining
In Morano v. State 44 the court of criminal appeals stated that a defend-
133. 582 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (Odom, Roberts, Phillips, & Clin-
ton, JJ., dissenting).
134. Id. at 817.
135. The dissent agreed with Corley that he was constitutionally entitled to have his
competency judged by the standard announced in Dusky. Id. at 822.
136. Id. at 818.
137. The statutory test of competency uses virtually the identical language as that in the
Dusky test. An important distinction between the two tests in that Dusky is phrased in the
conjunctive while the Texas statute is phased in the disjunctive. Compare Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § l(a)
(Vernon 1979).
138. See, e.g., Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1973); Daugherty v. Beto, 388
F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1968).
139. Exparte Locklin, 583 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
140. 583 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
141. Id. at 788.
142. 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
143. 583 S.W.2d at 788.
144. 572 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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ant does not have an absolute right to plea bargain.145 The trial judge may
refuse to permit plea bargaining and recommendations by the prosecutor
concerning the punishment to be assessed.' 46 Moreover, the trial judge
may disallow plea bargaining before a defendant enters a plea of guilty
where the defendant and his attorney were aware of the possibility of such
denial. 147
When plea bargaining is permitted and the prosecutor enters into an
agreement with the defendant, the federal constitution requires the prose-
cutor to uphold his end of the agreement. 48 Thus in Bass v. State,149 in
which the defendant entered a plea of guilty before the court pursuant to a
plea bargaining arrangement, the defendant was able to withdraw his
guilty plea when it was shown that the prosecutor had not lived up to his
part of the agreement. 150 The court stated the prosecutor's breach of the
agreement raised doubt as to whether the defendant's plea truly could be
considered voluntary.' 5'
B. Guilty Pleas
Guiltv Plea by a Defendant Asserting Innocence. In North Carolina v. A-
ford' 52 the United States Supreme Court held that a trial judge may accept
a plea of guilty despite the defendant's protestations of innocence. The
Court stated that although a criminal defendant does not have an absolute
right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted, the states
may confer such a right by statute or otherwise. 53 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals adopted the Aford approach in Moon v. State. ' " This
decision overturned a long line of cases that had held that the court was
required to withdraw a defendant's plea of guilty upon the court's own
volition if evidence was introduced that reasonably and fairly raised an
issue of fact as to the defendant's innocence.' 55 The effect of Moon is to
place the acceptance or withdrawal of a guilty plea within the discretion of
the trial court. In a partial dissent, Judge Roberts pointed out that the
majority failed to note that the Supreme Court in Aford emphasized that a
trial judge may accept a guilty plea only after a careful determination has
been made that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. 56 When
145. Id. at 551.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971).
149. 576 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
150. 576 S.W.2d at 401. The statutory requirements for entering a guilty plea are set out
in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
151. 576 S.W.2d at 401.
152. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
153. Id. at 38 n.11.
154. 472 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
155. See, e.g., Malone v. State, 548 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Woodberry v.
State, 547 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Sanchez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1976); Cooper v. State, 537 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
156. 400 U.S. at 31. See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Kercheral v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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the evidence raises an issue concerning the defendant's innocence, Judge
Roberts suggested that the trial court should be required to stop the guilty
plea hearing to determine whether the plea is voluntary and whether the
accused is aware of the conflict between his plea and the evidence. 157
Plea-Bargaining Guilty Plea in Capital Murder Case. In Ex parte
Dowden 158 the defendant was charged with capital murder. By plea bar-
gaining with the defendant, the state obtained a guilty plea in exchange for
a waiver of the death penalty. After the guilty plea was accepted by the
trial court and punishment was set at life imprisonment, the defendant
filed a writ of habeas corpus to set aside the guilty plea. Relying on section
12.31 of the penal code, 159 which makes capital murder a separate offense,
punishable by a mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment, the
appellate court held that the state cannot waive the death penalty in a
capital murder case. ' 60 The court also held that a defendant cannot waive
his right to trial by jury in a capital felony case.' 6 1 In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Roberts pointed out that the state was not precluded from dis-
missing the capital felony indictment in order to proceed on an indictment
or information for a lesser offense. By prosecuting the defendant for a
non-capital murder, the state could avoid section 12.31 of the penal code
and thereby plea bargain a sentence of life imprisonment in exchange for a
guilty plea.' 62
IV. TRIAL
A. Right to an Interpreter
Ferrell v. Estelle 63 involved a habeas corpus proceeding that reviewed
the murder conviction of a deaf defendant. The defendant became deaf
shortly before trial and as a result could not communicate effectively ex-
cept by writing.164 At trial, defense counsel demanded that a stenographer
simultaneously translate the proceedings for the defendant. 65 The court
denied the request but informed the defendant's attorney that unlimited
recesses would be granted. Only two recesses were demanded and both
were granted. Based on these facts, the defendant challenged the validity
of his conviction.' 66 The Fifth Circuit found that Ferrell's due process
157. 572 S.W.2d at 688.
158. 580 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
159. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 12.31 (Vernon 1974).
160. 580 S.W.2d at 366.
161. Id. A defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any of his
rights except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1.14 (Vernon 1977).
162. 580 S.W.2d at 367.
163. 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1978).
164. Id. at 1129.
165. In Ralph v. Georgia, 124 Ga. 81, 52 S.E. 298 (1905), the Supreme Court of Georgia
stated that such a procedure would be impractical. The Fifth Circuit rejected this dictum.
568 F.2d at 1133 n.6.
166. The defendant alleged that his rights to confront witnesses and to assist in his own
defense under art. I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution were violated. 568 F.2d at 1130.
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rights to confront witnesses and to assist counsel in his own defense had
indeed been violated. 167 The court reasoned that "such a trial comes close
to being an invective against an insensible object, possibly infringing upon
the accused's basic right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
trial."' 68 The court remanded the case for retrial stating that Ferrell was
entitled to a stenographer if he was unable to learn to communicate in any
way other than writing. 169
The Texas Legislature, probably as a result of Ferrell, has expanded the
statutory provisions safeguarding a deaf defendant's procedural rights to
be informed at trial. As previously written, article 38.31 of the code of
criminal procedure provided that all deaf defendants were entitled to a
qualified interpreter in a criminal prosecution. °7 0 The amended article
now specifies that upon a motion by the defendant, the court shall appoint
a qualified interpreter to "interpret in a language that the defendant can
understand, including but not limited to sign language, communications
concerning the case."' 7
B. Voir Dire-Capital Cases
The United States Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 72 declared
that a venireman can be removed for cause only if he is "irrevocably com-
mitted, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death
regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course
of the proceedings."'' 73 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has asserted
that the Witherspoon rule is effectively followed in Texas when, in fact, it is
in dire need of revitalization. 174 In two recent decisions, Burns v. Estelle 75
and Jurek v. Estelle,176 the Fifth Circuit provided some of the needed reju-
venation.
In Burns the court held that a prosecutor cannot disqualify a prospective
juror simply by eliciting a concession from the person that he has reserva-
tions about the death penalty that would effect his deliberation on any
issue of fact concerning punishment. 177 The court also narrowed the inter-
pretation of section 12.31(b) of the penal code. 178 This section allows dis-
qualification unless the juror states under oath that the death penalty or
life imprisonment will not affect his consideration of any issue of fact. The
court stated that in a situation in which the juror might be hesitant in the
167. The Fifth Circuit based its decision on authority from the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 1132.
168. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Natividad, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (Ariz. 1974) (en banc)).
169. Id. at 1133.
170. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 105, § 1, at 195.
171. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
172. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
173. Id. at 522 n.21.
174. Hippard, Criminal Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 505, 538
(1979).
175. 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1979).
176. 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
177. 592 F.2d at 1301.
178. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
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sense that he would desire to be sure of the facts where the death penalty
might apply, a statute permitting removal on this ground would render the
statute impermissibly broad. 179 The effect of Burns is to limit the prosecu-
tion's ability to manipulate the composition of the jury.
The Witherspoon rule has also been diluted by the prosecutorial practice
of asserting waiver when a defense attorney fails to object to the constitu-
tionality of an improper exclusion of a prospective jurer. In Wainwright v.
Sykes, 180 the Supreme Court held that the defendant's failure to object
prevents him from raising a claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
unless he can show cause for his failure to object and that prejudice re-
sulted from that failure. 181 Applying this test in Jurek v. Estelle,182 the
Fifth Circuit held that the defendant was able to show both cause and
prejudice, and therefore his Witherspoon claim was not barred. 183 The
court found cause to exist for two reasons. First, the court stated that at-
torney misfeasance could constitute cause under Sykes. Moreover, the
court concluded that an attorney's ignorance of Witherspoon was a serious
form of misfeasance. 184 Secondly, the court stated that there was cause
due to the fact that Texas procedures were insufficiently hospitable to
federal Witherspoon claims:
By specifying that objections to improper challenges must be made
immediately, Texas established a procedural requirement which obvi-
ously cannot be met by an attorney unaware of Witherspoon. Then
Texas licensed just such an attorney and appointed him to represent
Jurek. In this particular case, then, Texas made it effectively impossi-
ble for Jurek to assert his Witherspoon claim.' 85
The court found prejudice a less complex matter. Relying on Davis v.
Georgia186 and Marion v. Beto, 187 the court felt compelled 188 to hold that
the exclusion of even one juror in violation of Witherspoon was prejudi-
cial. It would appear from the holdings in Burns and Jurek that circum-
vention of Witherspoon will prove difficult in the future.
C. Guilt-Innocence Stage. Evidence, Jury Charge, Jury Misconduct
Evidence. Article 46.02, section 3 and article 46.03, section 3 of the code of
criminal procedure 189 provide for the appointment, by the court, of experts
to examine the defendant with regard to his competency to stand trial and
also his sanity or insanity if the insanity defense is submitted. Section 3(g)
179. 572 F.2d at 1301.
180. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
181. Id. at 97.
182. 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
183. Id. at 684.
184. Id. at 683.
185. Id. at 684.
186. 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
187. 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
188. The Fifth Circuit stated that Davis and Marion make it clear that this sort of Wither-
spoon violation is regarded as prejudicial. 593 F.2d at 684.
189. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46.02, § 3 & 46.03, § 3 (Vernon 1979).
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of article 46.03190 further provides that the same experts may be used for
both examinations. Article 46.02, section 3(g), 19 1 though, states that "[n]o
statement made by the defendant during the examination or hearing on his
competency to stand trial may be admitted in evidence against the defend-
ant on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding." In DeRusse v.
State 92 a psychiatrist was appointed to make the dual purpose examina-
tion described in article 46.03, section 3(g). The doctor subsequently was
permitted to testify at the guilt stage of the trial regarding statements made
by the defendant during the examination. The defendant contended that
article 46.02, section 3(g) precluded the doctor from testifying at the guilt
stage of the trial as to statements made by the defendant during his compe-
tency examination. This case points out the hole created by articles 46.02
and 46.03 as article 46.03 does not contain a provision similar to article
46.02, section 3(g). The issue, then, was whether the article 46.02, section
3(g) exclusion applies to the dual purpose hearing authorized in article
46.03, section 3(g). The court held that the statements made by the defend-
ant at a combined competency and sanity hearing were admissible because
such testimony is highly probative and closely relates to the insanity de-
fense. 193 In so holding, the court stated that obtaining psychiatric testi-
mony concerning the accused's sanity at the time of the offense would be
impossible if article 46.02, section 3(g) applied and as a result, the jury
would be deprived of valuable evidence regarding the defendant's insanity
defense. 194 Moreover, the court reasoned that the defendant, who has
been examined in a combined competence and sanity examination, is in
the same position as an individual who was examined only with regards to
an insanity defense, thus the result should be the same. 195
Charge to the Jury. Article 36.14 of the code of criminal procedure permits
a defendant to dictate objections to the court reporter in the presence of
and with the consent of the court. 196 This article also requires that the
objections be transcribed, endorsed with the court's ruling and official sig-
nature, and filed with the clerk in time to be included in the transcript.' 97
In Dirck v. State'98 the defendant's attorney, with the consent of the court,
orally dictated his objections to the jury charge to the court reporter and
obtained a ruling from the court. The dictation and ruling were included
in the court reporter's notes, which were filed with the clerk and subse-
quently approved by the court. The state contended that the defense's fail-
ure to have the objections transcribed, endorsed, and officially signed was
190. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03, § 3(g) (Vernon 1979).
191. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 3(g) (Vernon 1979).
192. 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
193. Id. at 230.
194. Id.
195. Id Compare Ballard v. State, 519 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) with
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 3 (g) (Vernon 1979).
196. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon 1979).
197. Id.
198. 579 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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fatal to the preservation of the objections for appeal. The court of criminal
appeals held, after recognizing the liberal procedures used in civil courts,
that there was substantial compliance by the defendant and that the objec-
tions were properly preserved for appeal. 99 In so ruling, the court ex-
pressly overruled 2°° Smith v. State.20 1 In this regard, the legislature
recently has enacted article 36.15 of the code of criminal procedure, 20
2
which includes the same transcribing requirements as article 36.14.203 It is
assumed that the more informal procedure approved in Dirck will also be
permitted under article 36.15.
Jury Misconduct. Until Hollins v. State,2°4 the court of criminal appeals
never had occasion to pass on the specific question of the propriety of note
taking by a juror at trial. The court, after a detailed analysis of authorities
on the subject, 20 5 held that it would not conclude anything regarding the
permissability of note taking by Texas jurors.20 6 The court did mention,
however, that even if note taking were to be considered improper, no re-
versible error was created by the very limited note taking involved in this
particular case.207
D. Punishment Stage- Enhanced Sentencing
The Texas habitual criminal statute provides that anyone convicted of a
felony three times shall receive life imprisonment upon his third convic-
tion.20 8 The defendant in Rummel v. Estelle20 9 was accordingly given an
enhanced sentence of life imprisonment after his conviction for the felony
offense of obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. The indictment showed
that Rummel had two prior felony convictions: a 1964 presentation of a
credit card with intent to commit an $80.00 fraud and a 1969 passing of a
199. Id. at 202.
200. Id.
201. Smith v. State, 415 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). In Smith, the court stated
that a request to charge must be in writing and that the written requirement was not dis-
pensed with when notes were taken and included in the official transcript. Id. at 207.
202. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.15 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
203. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
204. 571 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
205. Most authorities do not view the taking of trial notes by jurors as jury misconduct.
Toles v. United States, 308 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1962); Goodloe v. United States, 188 F.2d 621
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951); United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479
(D.C.N.Y. 1940); Watkins v. State, 216 Tenn. 545, 393 S.W.2d 141 (1965).
206. 571 S.W.2d at 883.
207. Id. Three of the twelve jurors were taking notes when they were admonished by the
court. None of the notes taken were used by the jurors in deliberation, and the notes were
made part of the record after the trial judge had permitted the jurors to be interrogated.
208. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
209. 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). The defendant was sentenced under article 63 of the
old Texas Penal Code. The new penal code is essentially the same:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previ-
ously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous
felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previ-
ous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by
confinement . . . for life.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
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forged instrument with a face value of $28.36.210 The defendant appealed
on the ground that the life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment and therefore violated the eighth amendment. 2 1 The court noted
that, on its face, the statute relied upon did not violate the eighth amend-
ment. The court then used a four prong test to determine whether the
statute, as applied to the defendant, was unconstitutional. The court's
analysis considered: "(1) the nature of the offense, (2) the legislative pur-
pose behind the punishment, (3) the punishment that the defendant would
have received in other jurisdictions, and (4) the punishment meted out for
other offenses in the same jurisdiction. ' 21 2 The Fifth Circuit panel then
concluded that imposing a life sentence for these three crimes was so
grossly disproportionate to the offenses as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, and observed that "Texas now stands virtually alone in its
unqualified demand for life imprisonment for a three-time felon even
where his convictions were for minor property crimes involving neither
violence nor a remote possibility of violence. '21 3
The Fifth Circuit reconsidered the Rummel case in a rehearing en
banc.21 4 Unlike the panel majority, the en banc majority believed that the
Texas good time credit system and the possibility of parole must be consid-
ered 21 5 in any effort "to look at the system realistically. ' 21 6 Although the
court rejected the second prong of the test used by the panel majority, the
analysis of legislative objective, it did apply the other three prongs of the
test, and concluded that Rummel's sentence did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 2 17 Defendant's application for writ of certiorari has
been granted and the case is now pending in the Supreme Court.
E. Punishment Stage.- Psychiatric Testing
Article 37.071 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets out the
procedure for giving a death sentence in Texas, provides that the jury must
210. 568 F.2d at 1195.
211. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
212. 568 F.2d at 1197. The court adopted the test used in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
213. 568 F.2d at 1200.
214. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Judge Thornberry, who
had dissented from the original panel opinion, authored the opinion for the en banc major-
ity.
215. The court explained the good time credit system in some detail, and concluded that
Rummel could be eligible for parole within 12 years. Id. at 657-59.
216. Id. at 657.
217. Id. at 660-61.. The majority believed that application of the test would prove too
impractical to be accurate or helpful. The court also considered the state's argument that
Rummel's failure to object to his sentence at the punishment stage of his trial barred his
appeal. The court noted that "it is apparent that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
repeatedly rejected Rummel-like challenges to the Texas habitual criminal statute," and that
no state interest would be served by requiring Rummel to make a "futile gesture" at his trial.
Id. at 653. The court also pointed out that Texas law apparently does not require a contem-
poraneous objection when the constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant was
convicted is being challenged. Id. at 653-54.
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find that the defendant would commit violent acts constituting "a continu-
ing threat to society. ' '218 A prosecutor could conceivably strengthen his
case by having an incarcerated capital murder defendant examined by a
psychiatrist who is predisposed to diagnose the accused as a sociopath who
constitutes an absolute threat to society. Last year's Survey pointed out
that a federal district court decision, Smith v. Estelle,219 had sharply cur-
tailed this practice. 220
During the current survey period, the Fifth Circuit, in Smith v. Es-
telle,22' not only upheld, but broadened the district court's holding. Ap-
proximately six weeks after Smith's arrest for capital murder, the state trial
judge asked the prosecutor to have Smith examined by Dr. Grigson, a psy-
chiatrist. Dr. Grigson examined Smith for ninety minutes and concluded
that Smith was competent to stand trial. The defense attorneys were never
informed of the examination, nor did Dr. Grigson's name appear on the
prosecutor's pre-trial witness list. The prosecution nevertheless called the
psychiatrist to testify, not on the defendant's competence, but on the vio-
lent nature of his character.222 Following Gardner v. Florida,223 the Fifth
Circuit held that the defense counsel's inability to challenge the evidence
effectively under the circumstances required setting aside the conviction.224
The court also held that the defendant has a right to remain silent during
such psychiatric examinations 225 and that a defendant in custody must be
warned of this right.226 A defendant has no constitutional right to have an
218. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Before a de-
fendant may be sentenced to death, the jury must also find that "the conduct of the defend-
ant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result," and "if
raised by the evidence, [that] the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unrea-
sonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased." Id. art. 37.071b(1)-(3).
219. 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977), af'd, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
220. Hippard, supra note 174, at 547.
221. 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979). See Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (affirming Smith's original conviction); Smith v.
Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (federal habeas corpus case). The federal district
court held (1) that the defendant was denied due process of law, (2) that he was unfairly
denied the right to present complete testimony regarding mitigating factors relating to his
alleged personality disorder, (3) that he was denied the right to counsel in this case, although
there is no right to the presence of counsel at a psychiatric examination, and (4) that the
defendant was not advised of his "right to remain silent at the psychiatric examination on
dangerousness where he did not seek to introduce psychiatric testimony on the issue himself
at the punishment stage or at the guilt/innocence stage and where he did not initiate a
psychiatric examination on the issue." 445 F. Supp. at 664.
222. 602 F.2d at 696-97.
223. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
224. The court noted that if the defense attorneys had not been surprised by Grigson's
testimony, their defense would have been much more effective. 602 F.2d at 698-703, 699 n.7.
225. The state had argued that the evidence the psychiatrist relied on was "non-testimo-
nial" and therefore not within the protection of the fifth amendment privilege. The court
rejected this argument, however, noting that the psychiatrist's diagnosis was based "on com-
ments Smith made and failed to make. . . .Plainly then, Dr. Grigson-and therefore the
prosecution when it called him as a witness-used the content, not the non-testimonial as-
pects of Smith's statements." 602 F.2d at 704. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (explaining the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence).
226. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Fifth Circuit concluded that
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attorney present during a psychiatric evaluation of his dangerousness; he
does, however, have a constitutional right to counsel at the pre-trial stage,
and should be allowed to consult an attorney before deciding whether to
submit to the examination.2 27
V. POST TRIAL
A. Appeal
Permission to Appeal after Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere. If a defend-
ant in a criminal case has been convicted upon his plea of guilty or of nolo
contendere, and if the court has assessed a punishment that does not ex-
ceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the
defendant and his attorney, the defendant may not appeal without the per-
mission of the trial court except on those matters that have been raised by
written motion filed prior to trial.228 Two recent cases held that this statu-
tory restriction, contained in article 44.02 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, does not apply to a defendant who did not personally agree to the
punishment recommended by the prosecutor. In Decker v. State229 the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the statutory requirement that
the sentence be agreed to "by the defendant and his attorney" means that
the defendant must personally agree to the recommended punishment. In
both Decker and Broggi v. Curry230 the court held that where the record
failed to reflect personal consent by the defendant, the defendant was enti-
tled to appeal without permission of the trial court.
A recent change in article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure23' is
designed to eliminate situations like those in Decker and Broggi. In its
new form, article 26.13 requires that prior to accepting a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the court shall "admonish the defendant" of:
(1) the range of the punishment attached to the offense;
(2) the fact that the recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as
to punishment is not binding on the court ...
(3) the fact that if the punishment assessed does not exceed the pun-
ishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defend-
ant and his attorney, the trial court must give its permission to the
since the defendant was in custody during the examination, he was constitutionally entitled
to the warning.
227. The court cited several Supreme Court cases that discuss the vital need for counsel
at the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). The court
summarized its holding as follows:
We therefore hold that at the sentencing phase of a capital trial, Texas may
not use evidence based on a psychiatric examination of the defendant unless
the defendant was warned, before the examination, that he had a right to re-
main silent; was allowed to terminate the examination when he wished; and
was assisted by counsel in deciding whether to submit to the examination.
602 F.2d at 709.
228. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979).
229. 570 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
230. 571 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
231. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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defendant before he may prosecute an appeal on any matter in the
case except for those matters raised by written motions filed prior to
trial.232
Permission to Appeal Unnecessary in Habeas Corpus Proceedings. The de-
fendant in Ex pare Barcelo233 entered into a plea bargain on a felony
indictment but later attempted to appeal his conviction. After being sen-
tenced to prison, he filed a writ of habeas corpus asserting that the indict-
ment did not charge a felony offense. The state contended that the
defendant was not entitled to relief because he had not obtained the trial
court's permission to appeal as required by article 44.02.234 The appellate
court summarily rejected the state's argument, observing that "[a]s we con-
strue article 44.02 it does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. 235
B. Probation and Probation Revocation
Effect of Jury's Recommendation. In Franklin v. State236 the defendant was
found guilty of driving while intoxicated; the jury assessed his punishment
at three days in jail and a $100 fine, with a recommendation that the jail
term be probated. The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction,
however, on the grounds that the statute relating to misdemeanor proba-
tion 237 does not permit the jury to recommend probation for only part of
the defendant's sentence. This conclusion followed the court's earlier
holding in Taylor v. State,238 which determined that article 42.13 allows
the jury to recommend probation, but such probation must extend to the
entire penalty, whether fine, jail time, or both. The court recognized the
Taylor finding that the express language of the statute requires that no
judgment be entered on a misdemeanor probation and that no finding of
guilt become final unless the probation is revoked. 239 Two other cases dur-
ing the survey period, Pointer v. State240 and Puente v. State,241 followed
the Franklin holding.
The 1979 revision of article 42.13, the misdemeanor probation statute, 242
232. Id. The omitted portion of art. 26.13(a)(2) deals with the special procedures to be
followed if there are any plea bargaining agreements.
233. 577 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
234. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979).
235. 577 S.W.2d at 500. The court then set aside the defendant's conviction because the
allegations of the indictment were insufficient to allege a felony, despite the fact that the
evidence presented at trial apparently supported a felony conviction. Id.
236. 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
237. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.13 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
238. 549 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
239. 576 S.W.2d at 622. The dissent in Franklin, which would have overruled Taylor,
argued that the statutory requirement that the defendant must satisfy all the requirements of
art. 42.13(3)(d) before receiving a probated sentence, authorizes the split probation used by
the Franklin jury: "Among those requirements are that the defendant has paid all costs of
his trial and so much of anyfine imposed as the court directs. The court may order that all or
part of such a fine be paid as a condition of probation." Id. at 627 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
240. 577 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
241. 579 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc).
242. The title of the article has been changed from "Misdemeanor Probation Law" to
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will apparently change the rule set forth in Franklin. The new statute spe-
cifically allows the court to "place the defendant on probation or impose a
fine applicable to the offense committed and also place the defendant on
probation as hereinafter provided. '243 The statute further provides that
"[wihen the jury recommends probation, it may recommend that the im-
prisonment or fine or both such fine and imprisonment found in its verdict
may be probated."' 244 Although a complete analysis of the extensive
changes made in article 42.13 is beyond the scope of this survey article, it
should be noted that several of the changes are major ones. The statute
provides, for example, that, under certain conditions, a defendant may be
placed on "community-service probation. ' 245 The new statute also sug-
gests several new conditions for probation, including the requirements that
the probationer participate in a community-based program on alcohol and
drug abuse, reimburse the county for the defendant's appointed counsel,
and pay a percentage of his income to the victim of the offense. 246
Conditions for "Shock Probation." In Houlihan v. State247 the defendant
was granted probation for his felony marijuana conviction. His probation
was later revoked and he began serving his sentence. Pursuant to article
42.12B, section 3e of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge
may, after the expiration of 60 days and before the expiration of 120 days
from the date execution of the sentence actually begins, on his own mo-
tion, or on written motion of the defendant, suspend further execution of a
felony sentence and place the defendant on probation, provided the de-
fendant has never before been confined in a penitentiary for a felony of-
fense.248 The defendant in Houlihan moved that he be considered for this
shock probation. The trial court refused to grant the motion and stated, as
one of its reasons, that the defendant had been granted probation earlier
and was therefore ineligible for shock probation under section 3e.
The appellate court dealt first with the question of jurisdiction, and held
that, in the circumstances of this case, affirmance by the court of criminal
appeals of the trial court's order revoking probation and pronouncing sen-
tence did not preclude subsequent assertion of authority by the trial court
to hear the defendant's motion for shock probation.249 The appellate court
"Misdemeanor Adult Probation and Supervision Law." 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 807, § 1,
at 2062.
243. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.13, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
244. Id. at § 3a.
245. Id. at § 3B. This section provides a list of specific information and requirements
applicable to the program.
246. Id. at §§ 6(10), (11), (14).
247. 579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) The court explained that since
§ 3e is silent as to a right of appeal from a refusal to grant "shock probation," the court
lacked authority to entertain a direct appeal such as that brought by appellant. The court
therefore treated the appeal "as an application for the extraordinary writ of mandamus."
Id. at 216-17.
248. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12B, § 3e (Vernon 1979).
249. 579 S.W.2d at 217.
[Vol. 34
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
then rejected the trial court's analysis of the defendant's eligibility for pro-
bation under section 3e, and explained that:
Nothing in the section can be read to mean that one who has been
previously granted probation is ineligible for consideration for "shock
probation"-neither one who has successfully completed a term of
probation in some other case nor one who "flunked" and had his pro-
bation revoked in the same case.250
The diligent defense attorney should, therefore, always consider filing a
motion for shock probation within the 120 day period, even if his client is
in prison because of a prior probation revocation on the same offense.
Effect of a Plea of True. At her probation revocation hearing, the proba-
tioner in Cole v. State25' pled true to the charge of violating her probation.
Despite her testimony, which raised defensive issues, the trial court re-
voked her probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court
should have withdrawn her plea of true when defensive issues were raised.
The appellate court held, however, that the court was correct in not with-
drawing the plea of true, and that a probationer's plea of true, standing
alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of probation.252 The court
reasoned that in probation revocations, just as in trials, in which the de-
fendant waives his right to a jury trial and then pleads guilty, the trial
court is the sole trier of the facts and must make its findings after consider-
ing all the evidence presented, including any defensive issues. Thus, the
trial court should not withdraw the defendant's plea of true even if he later
presents defensive issues.253
250. Id. at 218. The court nonetheless refused to direct the trial court to consider the
case on the merits, since the trial court's ruling did not come within the 120 day period
prescribed by the statute. Although appellant had argued that the 120 days refers only to the
filing of a motion rather than the ruling of the court, the appellate court held that the 120
days is jurisdictional, and that the trial court's power to act did not extend beyond that time.
251. 578 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
252. Id. at 127. The court overruled Roberson v. State, 549 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977). Roberson held that the trial court should have withdrawn a plea of true when the
probationer took the stand and raised a defensive issue, and allowed the defendant to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the parole violation.
253. The court pointed out the similarity of this situation to the one in Moon v. State, 572
S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc). The Moon court held that where the defend-
ant had waived a jury trial and plead guilty before the trial court, the trial court had no duty
to withdraw the guilty plea sua sponte even if the evidence raised defensive issues. See
discussion of Moon v. State at text accompanying notes 154-57 supra.
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